RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
STANDING: URBAN RENEWAL
DISPLACEES MAY CHALLENGE
REDEVELOPMENT PLANS
In Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency,' the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that urban renewal
relocation programs which allegedly deny displacees equal protection
or violate section 105(c) of the Housing Act of 19492 are appropriate
subjects for judicial review, and that those displacees have standing to
obtain such review in the federal courts. The court also held that the
association plaintiff, CORE, should be granted standing in this class
action if there was a compelling need to do so in order to protect the
rights of absent members of the class. In Norwalk, the local CORE
chapter, together with a number of individuals displaced by a federal
assisted urban renewal project, brought a class action in federal
district court against the redevelopment agency and others, alleging
racial bias in the plan for relocation of persons displaced by the
project. The plaintiffs sought discontinuation of demolition pending
satisfactory relocation of residents of the project site, and
construction of low-cost housing instead of planned middle-income
units. The district court, expressing concern for obstruction of the
nearly completed project, dismissed the action on the pleadings. It
held that neither the association nor the individual plaintiffs had
standing to challenge the relocation program, nor could they gain
such standing merely by alleging civil rights violations, and further
ruled that since CORE was not a member of the class the plaintiffs
claimed to represent, it had no standing to sue.3 The court of appeals
reversed and remanded the case to the district court for trial on the
merits.
In 1949 Congress passed the Housing Act, which authorized the
awarding of capital loans and grants for approved local urban
renewal projects. Section 105(c) of the Act was intended to alleviate
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the hardships suffered by urban renewal displacees by requiring the
local agency, prior to approval of the capital grant or loan contract,
to submit a comprehensive plan for the effective relocation of
displaced persons.' It was an unavoidable consequence of the program
that relocation hardships should bear most heavily on minority
groups, especially Negroes, often concentrated in blighted areas.
These groups typically had smaller incomes than their white
counterparts and were faced with significant discrimination in the
public housing market. This tended to cause relocation of nonwhite
displacees into existing segregated neighborhoods, often with
substandard housing, and contributed to a housing shortage resulting
in rents significantly higher than those previously paid.'
When these displacees turned to the courts for assistance, they met
with little success.7 The courts have generally been reluctant to permit
individuals to assert a denial of due process by an administrative
agency when the party seeking review has only a remote interest in the
outcome of the litigation.' Allegations of such violations in urban
relocation cases were commonly dismissed as improper attempts to
circumvent the statutory limitations of section 105(c) of the Housing
Act and to obtain unauthorized judicial review of administrative
decisions. 9 Yet when displacees alleged violations of the relocation
provisions themselves, the courts, apparently foreseeing the
obstruction of urban renewal programs by multiple lawsuits, held
with considerable uniformity that the Act did not give displacees
standing to sue for alleged deviations,' 0 particularly when the
complaint alleged infringements upon economic interests." For
similar reasons, the courts have held that plaintiffs who had no right
to sue under section 105(c) could not escape their plight by relying
upon the standing offered to "persons aggrieved by administrative
action"' 2 under section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act. 3
Id. at § 1455(c), as amended, (Supp. II, 1965-66).
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Relying upon an alternative ground to deny standing, the Ninth
Circuit held that review of determinations made under the Housing
Act was limited to parties to the urban renewal contract.'4 While
speaking in terms of standing to sue, that court seemingly precluded
any individual judicial review of such determinations, in recognition
of the expertise involved. 5 The issue of standing, however, was
apparently bypassed by the courts in some relocation cases, in which
the complaints of displacees were resolved on the merits. 6
Moreover, courts have agreed to review alleged administrative denials
of equal protection provided the complaint alleged a calculated plan
to deny such rights." In Gart v. Cole, the Second Circuit provided an
indication of the outcome in the instant case when it held that the
Housing Act was intended to protect the interests of displacees, and
granted them standing to protest the denial of a relocation hearing.' 8
In Norwalk, the court considered separately the plaintiffs'
constitutional and statutory claims, both as to standing and as to
justiciability. It held that the plaintiffs, as displacees, had a direct and
personal interest in the outcome of the litigation, and were asserting a
right-"the right not to be subjected to racial discrimination in
government programs"' 9-which the courts would protect. Hence the
plaintiffs had standing to obtain judicial review of the alleged denial
of equal protection.2 0 Further, the court ruled that although
formulation of the statutory standard was a political matter not
subject to review, 2' allegations that its applicationresulted in racial
discrimination warranted judicial scrutiny. 22 Thus, if under the
relocation program.members of minority races were unable to obtain
satisfactory relocation housing as easily as whites, the standard
would be operating to deny minority displacees equal protection.23
Morever, that the existing pattern of discrimination is "accidental" to
104 (7th Cir. 1962); Gart v. Cole, 263 F.2d 244,250 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 978 (1959).
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the renewal program was found to be irrelevant. The bare fact of
discrimination arising out of application of the relocation standard
was sufficient to warrant access to the courts. 24 The court noted that
this holding might require classification of relocation efforts by race,
but held that this was proper, and in some instances mandatory, if the
classification was designed to alleviate the effects of racially unequal
treatment. 25 With regard to the alleged violations of section 105(c) of
the Housing Act, the court declined to follow existing precedent
and ruled that since the displacee was the person most vitally
concerned with the relocation program, 26 and since Congress had
clearly expressed concern over his plight,27 he had standing to seek
relief from such violations. The court rejected the argument that
standing should be limited to parties to the urban renewal contract,
holding that the prospect of administrative abuse was equally great
whether the federal program was implemented through contract or
through direct regulation, and hence the rationale behind allowing
standing for displacees in such cases was not weakened by the presence
of such a contract. 28 The issue to be decided, then, was whether
administrative actions under section 105(c) would ever be subject to
judicial inquiry. 29 The court held that unless Congress had indicated a
contrary intent, as was not the case here, such actions would not be
insulated from judicial review. 0 The court cautioned, however, that it
was reviewing neither the planning of urban renewal projects nor the
adequacy of the relocation standards derived by Congress, and that
future claims of this type would be subjected to careful scrutiny to
avoid unreasonable interference with urban renewal programs.3'
The court proposed a dual requirement for standing of association
plaintiffs in a class action: that the association must exist for the
purpose of representing the interests of that class, and that there be a
compelling need to grant standing in order to protect the interests of
absent members.32 CORE appears to satisfy the first criterion,
24Id. at 931.
2Id.
at 931-32; cf. Kaplan, EqualJustice in an Unequal World: Equalityfor the Negro-The
Problem ofSpecial Treatment,61 Nw. U.L. REv. 363, 379-83 (1966).
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although its purpose is considerably broader than that of representing
urban renewal displacees. However, the authority cited in support of
the "compelling need" requirement weakens the argument for
standing in this case, as there are individual plaintiffs present who
should be able to defend the interests of absent members of the class
(indeed the court inclines toward this view), and standing is not
necessary to enable CORE to provide legal and financial assistance.
Because the case was decided at the pleading stage and the merits
were not under consideration, the court offered little guidance for
formulation of relief measures. It is clear from the opinion, however,
that if there is discrimination against nonwhites on the housing
market' in a particular area, their right to equal protection will require
a racially "unequal" relocation standard. If the relocation program
meets the needs of whites more easily than those of nonwhites, then
even if the program is sufficiently intensive to relocate the nonwhite
displacees and thus satisfy the mandate of section 105(c) of the
Housing Act, there will still be a denial of equal protection. So it
appears that the Second Circuit has established a requirement in
addition to those of section 105(c): that the program be free from
even incidental racial discrimination. Satisfying the statute in light
of this increased emphasis on nonwhite relocation poses other difficulties. If the nonwhite housing shortage becomes sufficiently critical,
effective relocation may require assignment of large blocks of relocation housing exclusively to nonwhites, particularly if they constitute a
large percentage of displacees, as is usually the case. Thus urban
renewal could actually serve to perpetuate de facto segregation. Open
housing legislation should mitigate this result by facilitating a
broader redistribution of nonwhite displacees in the community. In
addition, it should make the court's incorporation of the equal
protection requirement into relocation programs less obstructive to
renewal projects, since to the extent that discrimination in housing
continues to exist, direct legal sanctions will be available both to
relocation personnel and to displacees. The more stringent relocation
standards may also bring about a change in the very nature of such
renewal projects. If existing relocation housing is insufficient to meet
the demand, new housing must be constructed. Since in congested
areas there is little or no land available for building of additional lowcost housing units, the cleared site must be utilized for that purpose if
the project is to proceed. The investment prospects of such land
utilization would hardly seem attractive to commercial developers, so
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to the extent that the project site must be so used, urban
reconstruction under the Housing Act may become largely a
government-financed low-cost housing venture. However, the
improvement in living conditions of low-income groups that should
result both from the increased requirements for effective relocation
and the change in the nature of urban renewal projects is perhaps
more desirable than the continued construction of shopping centers
and civic auditoriums.

